

IN THE MATTER OF POLICE MISCONDUCT PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE POLICE  
(CONDUCT) REGULATIONS 2020

BETWEEN

**THE COMMISSIONER OF THE CITY OF LONDON POLICE**

APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY

**AND**

**POLICE CONSTABLE ISAAC KEOWN**

OFFICER CONCERNED

1. This hearing was held on 20- 21 July 2026 at 21 New Street, London, EC2M 4TP. The Panel consisted of Commander Umer Khan (Chair), Ms Yvonne Walsh and Mr Martin Pike Independent Panel Members. Ms Dale Simon was the Legally Qualified Advisor to the Panel.
2. The Appropriate Authority (the AA) was represented by Mr Russell Fortt and the officer concerned was represented by Mr Thomas Beardsworth.

**THE ALLEGATIONS**

3. The allegations facing PC Keown are set out in the Regulation 30 Notice served upon him under the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020. After hearing evidence from PC Keown, counsel for the AA made an application to amend the dates in allegations 1 and 2 to better reflect the evidence in the case. The application was not opposed by counsel for PC Keown. The application was granted by the Panel. The amended Regulation 30 notice reads:

*“On 29th August 2023 and whilst on duty, you attended a domestic incident involving a vulnerable female who grabbed a knife with the apparent intention of self-harming. You disarmed her. That incident was recorded on your body-worn camera.*

### Allegation 1

*On or about 29<sup>th</sup> August 2023, you recorded part of that footage showing you disarming the female. You did so when at home, on a personal device, without authority and without any policing purpose for doing so.*

### Allegation 2

*On a date unknown, but after 29<sup>th</sup> August 2023, you electronically transmitted that recording to your cousin, PC Treadwell, an officer of the Gloucestershire Constabulary, without authority and without any policing purpose for doing so.*

*The above-described conduct constituted Gross Misconduct and breached the following Standards of Professional Behaviour: Confidentiality; Discreditable Conduct.”*

## **CASE SUMMARY**

4. PC Keown faces two allegations. Allegation 1 alleges that he recorded part of his Body Worn Video (BWV) footage of an incident on 29 August 2023 on a personal device without authority or any policing purpose. The BWV shows him disarming a vulnerable female who is in possession of a knife. Allegation 2 alleges that he sent the recording to his cousin, PC Treadwell, a Gloucestershire police officer, without authority or any policing purpose.
5. It is alleged by the AA that PC Keown’s conduct breached the Standards of Professional behaviour in respect of Confidentiality and Discreditable Conduct and that his conduct was so serious that it justifies dismissal.
6. PC Keown accepted the factual allegations in respect of allegation 1 and 2 and that his conduct breached the standards alleged. He also accepted that his conduct amounted to misconduct, but he denied that it amounted to gross misconduct.

## **EVIDENCE**

7. In advance of this hearing the Panel was supplied with the documents in accordance with the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020, which included a copy of the papers served on PC Keown in accordance with Regulations 17 and 30 and PC Keown’s

response to the AA under Regulations 18 and 31. In determining the facts in this case, the Panel had regard to:

- All documents and materials in the hearing bundle, whether they were explicitly referred to or not during the hearing.
- The oral evidence of PC Keown
- The Character statements produced on behalf of PC Keown
- The submissions made on behalf of the AA and Counsel for PC Keown.
- The legal advice provided by the LQA

## **THE PANEL'S APPROACH**

8. In considering the facts, the Panel was aware that the burden of proof is on the AA and the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. The Panel recognised that there is only one standard of proof in civil and regulatory cases, namely whether the facts in issue more probably occurred than not. The seriousness of an allegation does not of itself require more cogent evidence. The inherent probability of the relevant conduct is a matter which can be taken into account when weighing the probabilities and in deciding whether the event/conduct occurred; this goes to the quality of evidence.

## **FINDINGS OF FACT**

9. There is no dispute that PC Keown recorded part of his BWV footage from the incident on the 29 August 2023 on his personal phone without any lawful policing purpose to do so nor that he transmitted the recording to his cousin PC Treadwell. There is uncontested evidence that PC Treadwell subsequently shared the footage electronically with fellow officers. There is a dispute in respect of PC Keown's motivation for his actions and whether or not his cousin was an officer when PC Keown sent her the BWV footage.

10. It was the AA's case that PC Keown wilfully and knowingly breached his duty of confidentiality to "*show off*" to his cousin PC Treadwell. PC Keown denied trying to show off. In his Regulation 18 response PC Keown stated in summary that:

- He had been extremely shaken by the incident that he had filmed.
- He had recorded the incident on his personal telephone when he was at home that evening, because the police station was busy and he wanted to view the video without distraction.
- The day after the incident he spoke with a more experienced colleague in Neighbourhood Policing and their advice caused him to reflect heavily on his decision making. He became preoccupied with the "what ifs" and the incident stayed with him affecting his confidence on the job.
- He had sent the recording to his cousin because he wanted to '*open her eyes to the challenges officers faced*'. At the time of sending her the recording "she was either training or about to train or had finished her training to join the police".
- He recognised that this was a serious error of judgment.

11. On 10 November 2025, PC Keown was interviewed under misconduct caution. The summary of that interview records that he stated that he did not know why he did not use his work phone to record the material. He stated that he recorded the material because he had watched the footage hundreds of times and there were "months and months" between the actual incident and him sending the footage. He confirmed that he told his cousin not to show anyone the recording because he knew it was wrong to send it to her and he deleted the footage from his phone the following day and told his cousin to do the same because he realised that he shouldn't have recorded it or sent it.

12. The psychiatry report of Dr Qadri dated 4 June 2026 states PC Keown's presentation was consistent with trauma and stressor-related difficulties arising from the index incident, with features suggestive of unresolved trauma. However, at the time of the

index event there was no evidence of a severe mental disorder impairing PC Keown's reality testing or comprehension.

13. In oral evidence, PC Keown outlined his personal and family background, including a traumatic incident that occurred when he was approximately five years old. He stated that he had struggled with his mental health for some time, but he had not sought help until recently, and only then due to the insistence of his new partner. He stated that at the time of the incident in August 2023 he was going through a particularly difficult time in his personal life. Due to illness, he had not progressed through his probation as quickly as his peers, so he was taking on extra shifts on a Response Team as he was attached to a Neighbourhood Team which made it more difficult to achieve the necessary milestones.
14. He stated that the incident on the 29 August 2023 was the first time that he had encountered a member of public with a weapon. He stated that he was aware that officers are normally debriefed after this type of situation, but no one spoke to him. He described feeling shell shocked after the incident and feeling bad because he had made a mistake by allowing the female to go into the kitchen on her own. He stated that he started to play the incident over in his mind and doubt his abilities.
15. He stated that he believed that he had recorded the BWV footage onto his phone around the end of August 2023. He stated that he was ashamed to have a conversation about the incident which is why he recorded it on his phone. He was afraid that if he discussed the incident with the Response Team, they would not want him back. He stated that he did not want to keep accessing his BWV repeatedly in case this was picked up so he recorded the footage.
16. He described his relationship with PC Treadwell - he stated that they were first cousins who had a lot in common. He stated that he was further along in his policing career than her, as she was in basic training or had just finished, so he would give her advice. He stated that from discussions she appeared to have a different approach to policing than him, she was more physical and direct. He stated that he shared the video clip with her privately by a direct message on the social media platform Instagram, around September 2024. He stated that they were discussing policing and the effect that "*jobs can have on you*". He stated that he shared the video because he

couldn't explain to her in words and he wanted to show her the psychological effect as she didn't seem to be taking his concerns seriously

17. PC Keown stated that he did not find out that PC Treadwell had shared the video with anyone else until he was suspended from duty. He stated that he felt betrayed and hurt by her actions. He confirmed that he had not shared the video to show off as in his opinion it was an example of poor policing, so it was not something to boast about.
18. In response to cross examination PC Keown accepted that he was fully aware of the force confidentiality policies and that he knew at the time that he should not have recorded the BWV on his personal device and that he should not have then shared it with his cousin. He confirmed that he was aware of the help that was available to officers if they suffer from trauma, but he stated that he did not feel comfortable accessing the assistance. He accepted that he could have reviewed the BWV footage on his work tablet, and he could not explain why he recorded the clip on his personal phone.
19. He accepted that his reason in oral evidence for recording the BWV was different to his Regulation 31 response where he had stated that he recorded the footage at home because he did not want to be distracted. Inconsistencies in respect of the date when he transferred the clip to his cousin were also put to PC Keown, he had no explanation for the discrepancies. PC Keown accepted that, due to his lack of a clear recollection of the date he shared the clip, it is possible that he had already had the conversation and shared the clip with his cousin before she became an officer.
20. It was put to PC Keown that if his cousin was an officer when he shared the video with her, he would be putting her into the difficult position of having to disclose the breach of confidentiality. PC Keown responded that he realised that he was wrong as soon as he had sent the video; he stated that he knew that his actions were not acceptable, but he was just trying to offer an explanation. PC Keown stated that had not deleted the video for some 13 months because he was initially watching the video on repeat and he was having dreams and symptoms that didn't go away – "*watching the BWV pacified me*". He felt unable to delete the footage. He stated that it was a "*knee jerk response*" to delete the video the day after he shared it with his cousin; he

had shared too much about how he was feeling, and he also realised that he should not have the video on his phone.

21. In response to Panel questions PC Keown stated for the first time that he was now certain that he had shared the video with his cousin after the 2 September 2024 when she had become a police officer. He stated that if she wasn't an officer there would have been no need to have the conversation. The Panel observed that the latter part of his response to this point contradicted his earlier response provided during cross examination. He also stated he believed the video would persuade PC Treadwell because he had described other jobs to her and those descriptions did not appear to make an impact on her. He reviewed the BWV and the psychological impact that it had come back to him.

22. The Panel noted that PC Keown had not mentioned the possible impact of his actions on the female in the video. When asked by the Panel if he had given any consideration to how the female in the video would feel about their information being shared, he stated that his actions were not reflective of him as a police officer and that he had thought about it and had weighed heavily. He stated that he started to think about the impact on the female while the video was on his phone, but trauma responses overcame his wider thinking. He accepted that he should have put more emphasis on the impact on the female. PC Keown stated that he had not owned up to his wrongdoing before the investigation probably due to fear of the consequences of misconduct and the perception of his colleagues.

#### Panel determination

23. In assessing PC Keown's credibility as a witness the panel had regard to his good character and the positive character statements submitted on his behalf. However, the panel found that PC Keown was unable to explain the rationale for some of his decisions (e.g. why he used his personal phone to record the BWV) and the inconsistencies between his written evidence and his oral evidence. The Panel concluded that these inconsistencies detracted from his overall credibility as a witness. The Panel also found that his overall credibility was undermined by the lack

of plausibility of his explanation for sharing the BWV footage. In the opinion of the Panel, the video did not show the potential negative “psychological impact” that could arise from these situations. The Panel noted that the recording showed PC Keown successfully disarming a vulnerable female. The Panel, therefore, concluded that PC Keown’s evidence was not wholly reliable or credible, and as such they did not accept his explanations for recording the clip in the manner that he did and sharing the video.

24. The Panel noted the submission made by counsel for the AA in respect of drawing adverse inferences from the inconsistencies between PC Keown’s oral evidence and his Regulation 18 and 31 responses but concluded that the inconsistencies did not change the nature of PC Keown’s explanation for his actions. Therefore, the Panel concluded that it would not be appropriate to draw any adverse inferences from these specific inconsistencies in this case.

25. The Panel reminded itself that the burden of proving the AA’s case rests with the AA. The Panel concluded that the AA had not presented any credible evidence to support the assertion that PC Keown was motivated by a desire to “show off”. The AA could not simply rely on PC Keown’s lack of credibility as a witness to establish that he wanted to “show off” to his cousin. The Panel therefore concluded that the AA had failed to prove on the balance of probabilities that PC Keown was motivated by a desire to “show off”.

26. The Panel accepted that PC Keown’s mental well-being has suffered since the index incident on 29 August 2023 but concluded that there was no evidence to suggest that his condition had impacted his decision making. The Panel also noted that PC Keown accepted in oral evidence that he was fully aware of the confidentiality policy and that he knew at the time of recording the BWV footage and sharing the same with his cousin that his actions were wrong. The Panel concluded that even if there were a clear reason/motivation for recording and sharing the video, this in no way diminished the seriousness of PC Keown’s admitted conduct, as irrespective of any motivation his actions were deliberate and were taken with no authority or lawful purpose.

27. In respect of the dispute in respect of the status of PC Keown's cousin when the recording was transferred. The Panel noted that there were inconsistencies in the evidence of PC Keown, as to when the recording was shared with his cousin, dates ranged from 2 months after it was downloaded to September 2024 some 13 months after the recording was downloaded. The AA had not produced any evidence to establish the date when the video was shared, therefore, the Panel was unable to determine which of the dates provided by PC Keown was accurate. The Panel noted that PC Keown's cousin had been referred to in Allegation 2 as PC Treadwell the panel therefore found Allegation 2 proved on the basis that his cousin was a Constable when the recording was transferred.

#### BREACH OF STANDARDS

28. Having found the allegation of fact proved the Panel went on to consider whether the conduct found proved breached the standards alleged namely:

##### Confidentiality

*"Police officers treat information with respect and access or disclose it only in the proper course of police duties."*

##### Discreditable conduct:

*"Police officers behave in a manner which does not discredit the police service or undermine public confidence in it, whether on or off duty."*

29. The Panel noted that PC Keown accepts that his admitted conduct breached the standards alleged. The Panel agreed that by recording the BWV footage on his personal device for a non-policing purpose and then sending the recording to his cousin PC Keown had clearly breached the professional standard of confidentiality. There is considerable public concern arising from high profile cases where confidential and sensitive information has been shared inappropriately by police officers, therefore behaving in this manner also clearly breached the standard of discreditable conduct.

## GROSS MISCONDUCT OR MISCONDUCT

30. Having found the breaches of the standards as set out above proved, the Panel carefully considered whether the breaches amount to gross misconduct, misconduct or neither. Misconduct is defined in the Regulations as meaning a breach of the standards of professional behaviour that is so serious as to justify disciplinary action. Gross misconduct is defined as a breach of the standards of professional behaviour that is so serious as to justify dismissal. The Panel reminded itself of the circumstances of this case, the breaches of the standards found proved, the need to protect public confidence in, and the reputation of the Police Service, the need to maintain high professional standards and the need to protect the public and officers and staff by preventing similar misconduct in the future.

### AA's submissions on seriousness

31. It was submitted on behalf of the AA that the conduct found proved amounts to gross misconduct. The regulations are clear that police officers must only access confidential information with a proper policing purpose. Further the City of London Police Force Information Security Manual of Guidance reinforces the strict observance of maintaining confidentiality of data and there is also a general prohibition on sharing police information outside the City of London Police without formal authority. Counsel for the AA also referred the panel to the following paragraphs of the College of Policing's (CoP) guidance on outcomes in police misconduct proceedings:

4.34: *"The misuse of police computer systems or confidential police information more generally is a particular concern for the police service. Police computer and manual systems hold a significant amount of information about members of the public. Most of this is sensitive, and it is both a public expectation and a legal requirement that information obtained during the course of policing duties should be treated in strictest confidence, properly protected and used only for legitimate policing purposes"*

4.35: *"Under no circumstances should anyone access or use police information for personal benefit. Personal reasons for accessing confidential police information,*

*such as general curiosity or a desire to check on criminal activity near an officer's home, are not acceptable. If an officer is accessing police information not available to the general public, there should always be a specific and proper policing purpose for doing so."*

32. It was further submitted that the onward disclosure of information is listed as a factor that supports a more serious outcome and the misuse of police footage is a recurring problem within the police service which undermines public confidence.

Counsel for PC Keown submissions on seriousness

33. It was submitted on behalf of PC Keown that his breach of the standards amounts to misconduct only, and that the admitted conduct was not a "serious" breach set against the spectrum of confidentiality cases. In respect of culpability, it was submitted that the PC Keown's level of culpability was medium to low on the basis that it was a single incident, the breach of confidentiality was from one officer to other officers, the officer's relative youth and inexperience at the time of the incident and that he did not act maliciously or for personal gain.
34. It was submitted that the level of harm was low because it was a short clip in which the subject is not identified or identifiable, the video clip did not enter the public domain, and it did not affect any investigations. It was also submitted that there were no aggravating factors
35. In terms of mitigating factors, it was submitted that PC Keown had made early admissions and had assisted the AA's investigation by identifying himself as the sender of the video. Additionally, he had shown early and genuine remorse and PC Keown had shared the video clip during a "deeply personal exchange".

Panel determination on seriousness

36. In assessing the seriousness of PC Keown's conduct the Panel had regard to guidance which provides that panels should assess the seriousness of the proven conduct by reference to the officer's culpability for the misconduct, the harm caused by the misconduct, the existence of any aggravating factors and the existence of any mitigating factors.

37. The Panel determined that PC Keown was entirely culpable for his actions, he deliberately chose to record and share the BWV footage of a vulnerable female and in so doing he had abused his position as an officer, therefore the level of his culpability was significant.

38. In relation to harm the Panel found that public confidence in the police was likely to be significantly undermined if the public were aware of the circumstances of this case. There have been several high-profile cases that have led to significant public concern because of police officers accessing and sharing sensitive information. The Panel therefore found that the level of potential reputational harm to the police service was high.

39. The Panel found that the following aggravating factors were relevant in this case:

- The information accessed was sensitive
- PC Keown shared the BWV clip , as a private message on a social media Instagram platform, to PC Treadwell who was in a different police force
- PC Keown continued his behaviour after he realised, or should have realised that it was improper to do so
- Significant deviation from instructions whether an order, force policy or national guidance. PC Keown was fully aware of the confidentiality guidance and the potentially serious consequences of breaching the policy.

40. The Panel found that the following mitigating factors were relevant in this case:

- The Officer's early admissions
- Evidence of genuine remorse, but limited insight into the potential impact of his actions on the vulnerable female and the public

41. The Panel noted the report in respect of PC Keown's mental health but found that there was no suggestion that his poor mental health affected his reasoning capacity and his decision to record the BWV and transfer it to his cousin. On the contrary PC

Keown acknowledged that he was fully aware of the confidentiality policy when he recorded the BWV and shared the recording.

42. The Panel concluded that the level of seriousness in this case was high. The Panel therefore determined that the breaches of the standards of professional behaviour and level of seriousness of PC Keown actions were such as to justify dismissal and as such amounted to gross misconduct.

## OUTCOME

43. In determining the appropriate sanction, the Panel have had regard to PC Keown's service record, the facts admitted and found proved, the submissions made on behalf of the AA, Counsel on behalf of the Officer and the legal advice received from the LQA. The Panel applied the three-stage procedure set out in the College of Policing outcome guidance. The Panel assessed the seriousness of the misconduct, keeping in mind the purpose of imposing sanctions and chose the sanction which most appropriately fulfils that purpose for the seriousness of the conduct in question.
44. Counsel for the AA reaffirmed his earlier submissions in respect of seriousness and submitted that in light of the seriousness of the factors already identified by the Panel the only appropriate sanction was dismissal without notice.
45. Counsel for PC Keown produced two further character references and made a seven-point submission detailing the circumstances of this case. In particular, Counsel asked the Panel to take account of the officer's inexperience as an officer; he was in his probationary period at the time of the incident, his candour during the investigation process, his lack of supervisory support and the fact that the level of actual harm was low because the female was not identifiable, noting these were all factors that were relevant to the seriousness of the officer's conduct. As such a final written warning was the appropriate and proportionate sanction.
46. The Panel carefully reconsidered its assessment of seriousness in light of the further submissions advanced on behalf of PC Keown. Having done so, it concluded that those submissions did not materially alter its original assessment of the significant seriousness of the proven misconduct.

47. In assessing culpability, the Panel noted that, prior to becoming a police officer, PC Keown had been employed as a member of police staff and therefore had considerable experience of the standards, responsibilities, and restrictions associated with access to police information. Furthermore, during his evidence, PC Keown accepted that he knew his actions were wrong at the time they were committed. This demonstrated a clear awareness of both the relevant standards and the impropriety of his conduct.
48. The Panel did not accept that PC Keown's probationary status diminished his culpability or provided meaningful mitigation for his actions. Given his previous service within policing and his acknowledged understanding that his conduct was improper, the Panel was satisfied that he acted with full knowledge of the nature and consequences of his actions.
49. Taking all of these factors into account, the Panel concluded that PC Keown's culpability was assessed as high. His actions were deliberate, informed, and committed in circumstances where he knew, or ought plainly to have known, that his conduct was contrary to the standards expected of a police officer.
50. The Panel also did not accept that the level of harm was low. In the opinion of the Panel sharing images of a vulnerable female with others would potentially cause distress to the vulnerable female if she were made aware of the way that her image had been used. Although she was not identifiable solely from the clip, that does not mean that she would never be identified as the person involved. Also, the potential level of reputational harm to the police service was high. The Panel did not identify any additional aggravating factors or mitigating factors.
51. The Panel kept in mind at all times the threefold purpose of imposing sanctions, namely: (a) maintenance of public confidence in and the reputation of the police service; (b) upholding high standards in policing and deterring misconduct; (c) protection of the public. Of these, the maintenance of public confidence in and the reputation of the police service is paramount.
52. In line with the outcome guidance at paragraph 7.4, the Panel considered the least severe outcome first. The Panel noted that PC Keown had a previously unblemished

service record and had produced a number of positive character references which attest to his positive abilities as a police officer, however, the panel concluded that these factors did not outweigh the considerable public concern generated by recent high-profile cases involving police officers improperly disclosing sensitive information. In light of this, it concluded that a final written warning would neither be proportionate nor sufficient to reflect the gravity of the proven gross misconduct, maintain public confidence, uphold the high standards expected of the police service, and deter similar conduct by other officers. The Panel concluded that the intentional misuse of confidential police information, involving its access, recording, retention, and disclosure for non-policing purposes, amounted to an exceptionally serious abuse of trust. Such conduct strikes at the heart of the standards expected of police officers. In these circumstances, the Panel was satisfied that dismissal without notice was the only appropriate outcome.

24 July 2026

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### **Addendum to the Final Report: Organisational Learning Feedback**

During the course of the hearing, references were made to the level of support provided to officers following incidents, including the use of debriefs, TRiM (Trauma Risk Management), support for probationary officers, and the effectiveness of the Force's Professional Development Review (PDR) process.

### **Organisational Learning Recommendation**

It is recommended that the Force Learning and Organisational Development Team work in collaboration with the Human Resources Department to review and assess whether existing policies, procedures, and support mechanisms for officers remain appropriate, effective, and consistently applied. This review should ensure that officers receive the necessary support at the appropriate times throughout their service, particularly following traumatic or challenging incidents.

## **Conclusion**

The Panel commends these organisational learning points to the Chief Officer for consideration and implementation. It is the Panel's view that addressing these areas will enhance professional standards, improve service delivery to the public, and strengthen the trust and confidence that communities place in this police force.

These recommendations are made in the spirit of constructive improvement and in recognition that the maintenance of the highest standards of conduct and professionalism across the organisation is essential to upholding public trust in the policing profession.

24 July 2026